نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکترای مهندسی مالی، گروه حسابداری و مالی، دانشکده اقتصاد،مدیریت و حسابداری دانشگاه یزد
2 دانشیار، گروه حسابداری و مالی، دانشکده اقتصاد ، مدیریت و حسابداری دانشگاه یزد
3 استادیار، گروه مالی و حسابداری، دانشکده اقتصاد، مدیریت و حسابداری دانشگاه یزد
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This research aims to analyze the strategic behavior of investors within the framework of Initial NFT Offering (INO)-based crowdfunding. The central research problem lies in elucidating the interplay between private information, non-fungible token (NFT) pricing, and the funding threshold regarding investor participation and the mechanism’s ability to screen high-quality projects. The study employs a symmetric Bayesian game model within a large population under conditions of asymmetric information, where investors base their decisions on private signals. To evaluate the mechanism’s performance, we define two indices-‘accuracy’ and ‘participation rate’-and analytically prove the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. The model is validated through Monte Carlo simulations to assess result robustness and equilibrium sensitivity to key parameters. Findings indicate that while low prices incentivize widespread participation and high prices bolster informational screening, excessive pricing leads to equilibrium collapse. Furthermore, the funding threshold functions as a form of social insurance, facilitating the participation of less-informed investors. The innovation of this research lies in the operationalization of the information structure within INOs and the provision of a theoretical framework for designing efficient mechanisms for digital crowdfunding platforms.
کلیدواژهها [English]